Ian & Stuart's Australian Mac: Not for Sale/Another.not.for.sale (Australia).iso/Dr. Doyle/Locke's Toleration

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                       1689
          A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

                  by John Locke


           translated by William Popple





 HONOURED SIR,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts
about the mutual toleration of Christians in their
different professions of religion, I must needs answer
you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the
chief characteristic mark of the true Church. For
whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of
places and names, or of the pomp of their outward
worship; others, of the reformation of their
discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith - for
everyone is orthodox to himself - these things, and
all others of this nature, are much rather marks of
men striving for power and empire over one another
than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never so
true a claim to all these things, yet if he be
destitute of charity, meekness, and good-will in
general towards all mankind, even to those that are
not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a
true Christian himself. "The kings of the Gentiles
exercise leadership over them," said our Saviour to
his disciples, "but ye shall not be so."* The business
of true religion is quite another thing. It is not
instituted in order to the erecting of an external
pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion,
nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to the
regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of
virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under
the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and
above all things, make war upon his own lusts and
vices. It is in vain for any man to unsurp the name of
Christian, without holiness of life, purity of
manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. "Let
everyone that nameth the name of Christ, depart from
iniquity."*(2) "Thou, when thou art converted,
strengthen thy brethren," said our Lord to Peter.*(3)
It would, indeed, be very hard for one that appears
careless about his own salvation to persuade me that
he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is
impossible that those should sincerely and heartily
apply themselves to make other people Christians, who
have not really embraced the Christian religion in
their own hearts. If the Gospel and the apostles may
be credited, no man can be a Christian without charity
and without that faith which works, not by force, but
by love. Now, I appeal to the consciences of those
that persecute, torment, destroy, and kill other men
upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of
friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I
shall then indeed, and not until then, believe they do
so, when I shall see those fiery zealots correcting,
in the same manner, their friends and familiar
acquaintance for the manifest sins they commit against
the precepts of the Gospel; when I shall see them
persecute with fire and sword the members of their own
communion that are tainted with enormous vices and
without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition;
and when I shall see them thus express their love and
desire of the salvation of their souls by the
infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of
cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity,
as they pretend, and love to men's souls that they
deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal
punishments, starve and torment them in noisome
prisons, and in the end even take away their lives - I
say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians
and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer
whoredom, fraud, malice, and such-like enormities,
which (according to the apostle)*(4) manifestly relish
of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and
abound amongst their flocks and people? These, and
such-like things, are certainly more contrary to the
glory of God, to the purity of the Church, and to the
salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent
from ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from
public worship, whilst accompanied with innocence of
life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for God, for
the Church, and for the salvation of souls - burning I
say, literally, with fire and faggot - pass by those
moral vices and wickednesses, without any
chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be
diametrically opposite to the profession of
Christianity, and bend all its nerves either to the
introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of
opinions, which for the most part are about nice and
intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of
ordinary understandings? Which of the parties
contending about these things is in the right, which
of them is guilty of schism or heresy, whether those
that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last
be manifest when the causes of their separation comes
to be judged of He, certainly, that follows Christ,
embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, though he
forsake both father and mother, separate from the
public assemblies and ceremonies of his country, or
whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes, will
not then be judged a heretic.

Footnotes
 * Luke 22. 25.
 *(2) II Tim. 2. 19.
 *(3) Luke 22. 32.
 *(4) Rom. I.


Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects
should be allowed to be never so obstructive of the
salvation of souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery,
fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry,
and such-like things, cannot be denied to be works of
the flesh, concerning which the apostle has expressly
declared that "they who do them shall not inherit the
kingdom of God."* Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely
solicitous about the kingdom of God and thinks it his
duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men,
ought to apply himself with no less care and industry
to the rooting out of these immoralities than to the
extirpation of sects. But if anyone do otherwise, and
whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that
differ from him in opinion, he be indulgent to such
iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name
of a Christian, let such a one talk never so much of
the Church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions
that it is another kingdom he aims at and not the
advancement of the kingdom of God.

Footnotes
 * Gal. 5.


That any man should think fit to cause another man -
whose salvation he heartily desires - to expire in
torments, and that even in an unconverted state,
would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I
think, to any other also. But nobody, surely, will
ever believe that such a carriage can proceed from
charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that
men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess
certain doctrines, and conform to this or that
exterior worship, without any regard had unto their
morals; if anyone endeavour to convert those that are
erroneous unto the faith, by forcing them to profess
things that they do not believe and allowing them to
practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it
cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to
have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession
with himself; but that he principally intends by those
means to compose a truly Christian Church is
altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be
wondered at if those who do not really contend for the
advancement of the true religion, and of the Church of
Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the
Christian warfare. If, like the Captain of our
salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls,
they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect
example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His
soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering
them into His Church, not armed with the sword, or
other instruments of force, but prepared with the
Gospel of peace and with the exemplary holiness of
their conversation. This was His method. Though if
infidels were to be converted by force, if those that
are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off
from their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well
that it was much more easy for Him to do it with
armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the
Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.

The toleration of those that differ from others in
matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of
Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind,
that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not
to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so
clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and
ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of
others. These are faults from which human affairs can
perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet such
as nobody will bear the plain imputation of, without
covering them with some specious colour; and so
pretend to commendation, whilst they are carried away
by their own irregular passions. But, however, that
some may not colour their spirit of persecution and
unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the
public weal and observation of the laws; and that
others, under pretence of religion, may not seek
impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in
a word, that none may impose either upon himself or
others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to
the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the
worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary
to distinguish exactly the business of civil
government from that of religion and to settle the
just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If
this be not done, there can be no end put to the
controversies that will be always arising between
those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the
one side, a concernment for the interest of men's
souls, and, on the other side, a care of the
commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men
constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and
advancing their own civil interests.

Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and
indolency of body; and the possession of outward
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and
the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the
impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all
the people in general and to every one of his subjects
in particular the just possession of these things
belonging to this life. If anyone presume to violate
the laws of public justice and equity, established for
the preservation of those things, his presumption is
to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of
the deprivation or diminution of those civil
interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and
ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly
suffer himself to be punished by the deprivation of
any part of his goods, and much less of his liberty or
life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the
force and strength of all his subjects, in order to
the punishment of those that violate any other man's
rights.

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate
reaches only to these civil concernments, and that all
civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and
confined to the only care of promoting these things;
and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be
extended to the salvation of souls, these following
considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

First, because the care of souls is not committed to
the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It
is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it
appears not that God has ever given any such authority
to one man over another as to compel anyone to his
religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the
magistrate by the consent of the people, because no
man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation
as blindly to leave to the choice of any other,
whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what
faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if
he would, conform his faith to the dictates of
another. All the life and power of true religion
consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind;
and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever
profession we make, to whatever outward worship we
conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind
that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto
God, such profession and such practice, far from being
any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our
salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating
other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in
offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we
esteem to be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the
number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy and
contempt of His Divine Majesty.

In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong
to the civil magistrate, because his power consists
only in outward force; but true and saving religion
consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without
which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is
the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be
compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.
Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments,
nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as
to make men change the inward judgement that they have
framed of things.

It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make
use of arguments, and, thereby; draw the heterodox
into the way of truth, and procure their salvation. I
grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In
teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by
reason, he may certainly do what becomes any good man
to do. Magistracy does not oblige him to put off
either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing
to persuade, another to command; one thing to press
with arguments, another with penalties. This civil
power alone has a right to do; to the other, goodwill
is authority enough. Every man has commission to
admonish, exhort, convince another of error, and, by
reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give laws,
receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs
to none but the magistrate. And, upon this ground, I
affirm that the magistrate's power extends not to the
establishing of any articles of faith, or forms of
worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no
force at all without penalties, and penalties in this
case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not
proper to convince the mind. Neither the profession of
any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any
outward form of worship (as has been already said),
can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the
truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other
unto God be thoroughly believed by those that so
profess and practise. But penalties are no way capable
to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence
that can work a change in men's opinions; which light
can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or
any other outward penalties.

In the third place, the care of the salvation of men's
souls cannot belong to the magistrate; because, though
the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were
capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would
not that help at all to the salvation of their souls.
For there being but one truth, one way to heaven, what
hope is there that more men would be led into it if
they had no rule but the religion of the court and
were put under the necessity to quit the light of
their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own
consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to
the will of their governors and to the religion which
either ignorance, ambition, or superstition had
chanced to establish in the countries where they were
born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in
religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much
divided as in their secular interests, the narrow way
would be much straitened; one country alone would be
in the right, and all the rest of the world put under
an obligation of following their princes in the ways
that lead to destruction; and that which heightens the
absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity,
men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the
places of their nativity.

These considerations, to omit many others that might
have been urged to the same purpose, seem unto me
sufficient to conclude that all the power of civil
government relates only to men's civil interests, is
confined to the care of the things of this world, and
hath nothing to do with the world to come.

Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then,
I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining
themselves together of their own accord in order to
the public worshipping of God in such manner as they
judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the
salvation of their souls.

I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is
born a member of any church; otherwise the religion of
parents would descend unto children by the same right
of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone
would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his
lands, than which nothing can be imagined more absurd.
Thus, therefore, that matter stands. No man by nature
is bound unto any particular church or sect, but
everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in
which he believes he has found that profession and
worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope of
salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance
into that communion, so it can be the only reason of
his stay there. For if afterwards he discover anything
either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the
worship of that society to which he has joined
himself, why should it not be as free for him to go
out as it was to enter? No member of a religious
society can be tied with any other bonds but what
proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life.
A church, then, is a society of members voluntarily
uniting to that end.

It follows now that we consider what is the power of
this church and unto what laws it is subject.

Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon
whatsoever slight occasion instituted, whether of
philosophers for learning, of merchants for commerce,
or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and
discourse, no church or company, I say, can in the
least subsist and hold together, but will presently
dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be regulated
by some laws, and the members all consent to observe
some order. Place and time of meeting must be agreed
on; rules for admitting and excluding members must be
established; distinction of officers, and putting
things into a regular course, and suchlike, cannot be
omitted. But since the joining together of several
members into this church-society, as has already been
demonstrated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it
necessarily follows that the right of making its laws
can belong to none but the society itself; or, at
least (which is the same thing), to those whom the
society by common consent has authorised thereunto.

Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be
said to be a true church unless it have in it a bishop
or presbyter, with ruling authority derived from the
very apostles, and continued down to the present times
by an uninterrupted succession.

To these I answer: In the first place, let them show
me the edict by which Christ has imposed that law upon
His Church. And let not any man think me impertinent,
if in a thing of this consequence I require that the
terms of that edict be very express and positive; for
the promise He has made us,* that "wheresoever two or
three are gathered together" in His name, He will be
in the midst of them, seems to imply the contrary.
Whether such an assembly want anything necessary to a
true church, pray do you consider. Certain I am that
nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of
souls, which is sufficient to our purpose.

Footnotes

 * Matt. 18. 20.


Next, pray observe how great have always been the
divisions amongst even those who lay so much stress
upon the Divine institution and continued succession
of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their
very dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity
of deliberating and, consequently, allows a liberty of
choosing that which upon consideration we prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have
a ruler in their church, established by such a long
series of succession as they judge necessary, provided
I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to
that society in which I am persuaded those things are
to be found which are necessary to the salvation of my
soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty will be
preserved on all sides, and no man will have a
legislator imposed upon him but whom himself has
chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church,
I would only ask them here, by the way, if it be not
more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the
conditions of her communion consist in such things,
and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the
Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be
necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be
not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for
men to impose their own inventions and interpretations
upon others as if they were of Divine authority, and
to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely
necessary to the profession of Christianity, such
things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention,
or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires
those things in order to ecclesiastical communion,
which Christ does not require in order to life
eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a society
accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage;
but how that can be called the Church of Christ which
is established upon laws that are not His, and which
excludes such persons from its communion as He will
one day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I
understand not. But this being not a proper place to
inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only
mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees
of their own society, and that cry out continually,
"The Church! the Church!" with as much noise, and
perhaps upon the same principle, as the Ephesian
silversmiths did for their Diana; this, I say, I
desire to mind them of, that the Gospel frequently
declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer
persecution; but that the Church of Christ should
persecute others, and force others by fire and sword
to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet
find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society (as has already been
said) is the public worship of God and, by means
thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All
discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and
all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined.
Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society
relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods.
No force is here to be made use of upon any occasion
whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil
magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is
subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall
ecclesiastical laws be established, if they must be
thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer: They
must be established by means suitable to the nature of
such things, whereof the external profession and
observation - if not proceeding from a thorough
conviction and approbation of the mind - is altogether
useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the
members of this society are to be kept within their
duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If by
these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and
the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further
to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate
persons, who give no ground to hope for their
reformation, should be cast out and separated from the
society. This is the last and utmost force of
ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can
thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing
between the body and the member which is cut off. The
person so condemned ceases to be a part of that
church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in
the next place: How far the duty of toleration
extends, and what is required from everyone by it?

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the
duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her
bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately to
offend against the laws of the society. For, these
being the condition of communion and the bond of the
society, if the breach of them were permitted without
any animadversion the society would immediately be
thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such
cases care is to be taken that the sentence of
excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with
it no rough usage of word or action whereby the
ejected person may any wise be damnified in body or
estate. For all force (as has often been said) belongs
only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons
at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence
against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does,
nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of any of
those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All
those things belong to the civil government and are
under the magistrate's protection. The whole force of
excommunication consists only in this: that, the
resolution of the society in that respect being
declared, the union that was between the body and some
member comes thereby to be dissolved; and, that
relation ceasing, the participation of some certain
things which the society communicated to its members,
and unto which no man has any civil right, comes also
to cease. For there is no civil injury done unto the
excommunicated person by the church minister's
refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration
of the Lord's Supper, which was not bought with his
but other men's money.

Secondly, no private person has any right in any
manner to prejudice another person in his civil
enjoyments because he is of another church or
religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to
him as a man, or as a denizen, are inviolably to be
preserved to him. These are not the business of
religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him,
whether he be Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not
content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare
justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added
to it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs,
and this that natural fellowship we are born into
requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it
is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor
therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this
life because thou supposest he will be miserable in
that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private
persons differing from one another in religion, I
understand also of particular churches which stand, as
it were, in the same relation to each other as private
persons among themselves: nor has any one of them any
manner of jurisdiction over any other; no, not even
when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens)
comes to be of this or the other communion. For the
civil government can give no new right to the church,
nor the church to the civil government. So that,
whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or
separate from it, the church remains always as it was
before - a free and voluntary society. It neither
requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's
coming to it, nor does it lose the right of
instruction and excommunication by his going from it.
This is the fundamental and immutable right of a
spontaneous society - that it has power to remove any
of its members who transgress the rules of its
institution; but it cannot, by the accession of any
new members, acquire any right of jurisdiction over
those that are not joined with it. And therefore
peace, equity, and friendship are always mutually to
be observed by particular churches, in the same manner
as by private persons, without any pretence of
superiority or jurisdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let
us suppose two churches - the one of Arminians, the
other of Calvinists - residing in the city of
Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these
churches has right to deprive the members of the other
of their estates and liberty (as we see practised
elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some
doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the
meanwhile, silently stand by and laugh to see with
what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against
Christians? But if one of these churches hath this
power of treating the other ill, I ask which of them
it is to whom that power belongs, and by what right?
It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the
orthodox church which has the right of authority over
the erroneous or heretical. This is, in great and
specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every
church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or
heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it
believes to be true and the contrary unto those things
it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy
between these churches about the truth of their
doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both
sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at
Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose
sentence it can be determined. The decision of that
question belongs only to the Supreme judge of all men,
to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the
erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those men consider
how heinously they sin, who, adding injustice, if not
to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do
rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the
servants of another master, who are not at all
accountable to them.

Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these
two dissenting churches were in the right, there would
not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of
destroying the other. For churches have neither any
jurisdiction in worldly matters, nor are fire and
sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince
men's minds of error, and inform them of the truth.
Let us suppose, nevertheless, that the civil
magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put
his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they
might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will
any man say that any right can be derived unto a
Christian church over its brethren from a Turkish
emperor? An infidel, who has himself no authority to
punish Christians for the articles of their faith,
cannot confer such an authority upon any society of
Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has
not himself. This would be the case at Constantinople;
and the reason of the thing is the same in any
Christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in
every place. Nor can that power, in the hands of a
Christian prince, confer any greater authority upon
the Church than in the hands of a heathen; which is to
say, just none at all.

Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented
that the most violent of these defenders of the truth,
the opposers of errors, the exclaimers against schism
do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with
which they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where
they have the civil magistrate on their side. But so
soon as ever court favour has given them the better
end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves
the stronger, then presently peace and charity are to
be laid aside. Otherwise they are religiously to be
observed. Where they have not the power to carry on
persecution and to become masters, there they desire
to live upon fair terms and preach up toleration. When
they are not strengthened with the civil power, then
they can bear most patiently and unmovedly the
contagion of idolatry, superstition, and heresy in
their neighbourhood; of which on other occasions the
interest of religion makes them to be extremely
apprehensive. They do not forwardly attack those
errors which are in fashion at court or are
countenanced by the government. Here they can be
content to spare their arguments; which yet (with
their leave) is the only right method of propagating
truth, which has no such way of prevailing as when
strong arguments and good reason are joined with the
softness of civility and good usage.

Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor
churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just
title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of
each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are
of another opinion would do well to consider with
themselves how pernicious a seed of discord and war,
how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds,
rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto
mankind. No peace and security, no, not so much as
common friendship, can ever be established or
preserved amongst men so long as this opinion
prevails, that dominion is founded in grace and that
religion is to be propagated by force of arms.

In the third place, let us see what the duty of
toleration requires from those who are distinguished
from the rest of mankind (from the laity, as they
please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character
and office; whether they be bishops, priests,
presbyters, ministers, or however else dignified or
distinguished. It is not my business to inquire here
into the original of the power or dignity of the
clergy. This only I say, that, whencesoever their
authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it
ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church,
nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs,
because the Church itself is a thing absolutely
separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The
boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He
jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most
remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies,
which are in their original, end, business, and in
everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different
from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever
ecclesiastical office he be dignified, can deprive
another man that is not of his church and faith either
of liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon
the account of that difference between them in
religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole
Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become
lawful to any of its members.

But this is not all. It is not enough that
ecclesiastical men abstain from violence and rapine
and all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be
a successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the
office of teaching, is obliged also to admonish his
hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill towards
all men, as well towards the erroneous as the
orthodox; towards those that differ from them in faith
and worship as well as towards those that agree with
them therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all
men, whether private persons or magistrates (if any
such there be in his church), to charity, meekness,
and toleration, and diligently endeavour to ally and
temper all that heat and unreasonable averseness of
mind which either any man's fiery zeal for his own
sect or the craft of others has kindled against
dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how
happy and how great would be the fruit, both in Church
and State, if the pulpits everywhere sounded with this
doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I should seem
to reflect too severely upon those men whose dignity I
desire not to detract from, nor would have it
diminished either by others or themselves. But this I
say, that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that
professes himself to be a minister of the Word of God,
a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach otherwise, he
either understands not or neglects the business of his
calling and shall one day give account thereof unto
the Prince of Peace. If Christians are to be
admonished that they abstain from all manner of
revenge, even after repeated provocations and
multiplied injuries, how much more ought they who
suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them,
forbear violence and abstain from all manner of ill-
usage towards those from whom they have received none!
This caution and temper they ought certainly to use
towards those. who mind only their own business and
are solicitous for nothing but that (whatever men
think of them) they may worship God in that manner
which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in
which they have the strongest hopes of eternal
salvation. In private domestic affairs, in the
management of estates, in the conservation of bodily
health, every man may consider what suits his own
convenience and follow what course he likes best. No
man complains of the ill-management of his neighbour's
affairs. No man is angry with another for an error
committed in sowing his land or in marrying his
daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming
his substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or
build, or make whatsoever expenses he pleases, nobody
murmurs, nobody controls him; he has his liberty. But
if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not
there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed
ceremonies, or if he brings not his children to be
initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other
congregation, this immediately causes an uproar. The
neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour.
Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so great a
crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to
refrain from violence and rapine so long till the
cause be heard and the poor man be, according to form,
condemned to the loss of liberty, goods, or life. Oh,
that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would
apply themselves with all the strength of arguments
that they are able to the confounding of men's errors!
But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply
their want of reasons with the instruments of force,
which belong to another jurisdiction and do ill become
a Churchman's hands. Let them not call in the
magistrate's authority to the aid of their eloquence
or learning, lest perhaps, whilst they pretend only
love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal,
breathing nothing but fire and sword, betray their
ambition and show that what they desire is temporal
dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade
men of sense that he who with dry eyes and
satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the
executioner to be burnt alive, does sincerely and
heartily concern himself to save that brother from the
flames of hell in the world to come.

In the last place, let us now consider what is the
magistrate's duty in the business of toleration, which
certainly is very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not
belong to the magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I
mean (if I may so call it), which consists in
prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But
a charitable care, which consists in teaching,
admonishing, and persuading, cannot be denied unto any
man. The care, therefore, of every man's soul belongs
unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what
if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer: What if
he neglect the care of his health or of his estate,
which things are nearlier related to the government of
the magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate
provide by an express law that such a one shall not
become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is
possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not
injured by the fraud and violence of others; they do
not guard them from the negligence or ill-husbandry of
the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be
rich or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God
Himself will not save men against their wills. Let us
suppose, however, that some prince were desirous to
force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to
preserve the health and strength of their bodies.
Shall it be provided by law that they must consult
none but Roman physicians, and shall everyone be bound
to live according to their prescriptions? What, shall
no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is prepared
either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva shop?
Or, to make these subjects rich, shall they all be
obliged by law to become merchants or musicians? Or,
shall everyone turn victualler, or smith, because
there are some that maintain their families
plentifully and grow rich in those professions? But,
it may be said, there are a thousand ways to wealth,
but one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed,
especially by those that plead for compelling men into
this or the other way. For if there were several ways
that led thither, there would not be so much as a
pretence left for compulsion. But now, if I be
marching on with my utmost vigour in that way which,
according to the sacred geography, leads straight to
Jerusalem, why am I beaten and ill-used by others
because, perhaps, I wear not buskins; because my hair
is not of the right cut; because, perhaps, I have not
been dipped in the right fashion; because I eat flesh
upon the road, or some other food which agrees with my
stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways, which seem
unto me to lead into briars or precipices; because,
amongst the several paths that are in the same road, I
choose that to walk in which seems to be the
straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep
company with some travellers that are less grave and
others that are more sour than they ought to be; or,
in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or
is not, clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre?
Certainly, if we consider right, we shall find that,
for the most part, they are such frivolous things as
these that (without any prejudice to religion or the
salvation of souls, if not accompanied with
superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed or
omitted. I say they are such-like things as these
which breed implacable enmities amongst Christian
brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial and
truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all
things that are not of their mode, that from these
circumstances are different ends. What shall we
conclude from thence? There is only one of these which
is the true way to eternal happiness: but in this
great variety of ways that men follow, it is still
doubted which is the right one. Now, neither the care
of the commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws,
does discover this way that leads to heaven more
certainly to the magistrate than every private man's
search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a
weak body, sunk under a languishing disease, for which
(I suppose) there is one only remedy, but that
unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate
to prescribe me a remedy, because there is but one,
and because it is unknown? Because there is but one
way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe
for me to do whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those
things that every man ought sincerely to inquire into
himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his own
endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked
upon as the peculiar possession of any sort of men.
Princes, indeed, are born superior unto other men in
power, but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the
art of ruling does necessarily carry along with it the
certain knowledge of other things, and least of all of
true religion. For if it were so, how could it come to
pass that the lords of the earth should differ so
vastly as they do in religious matters? But let us
grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may
be better known by a prince than by his subjects, or
at least that in this incertitude of things the safest
and most commodious way for private persons is to
follow his dictates. You will say: "What then?" If he
should bid you follow merchandise for your livelihood,
would you decline that course for fear it should not
succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant upon the
prince's command, because, in case I should have ill-
success in trade, he is abundantly able to make up my
loss some other way. If it be true, as he pretends,
that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can
set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have broken
me. But this is not the case in the things that regard
the life to come; if there I take a wrong course, if
in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the
magistrate's power to repair my loss, to ease my
suffering, nor to restore me in any measure, much less
entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given
for the Kingdom of Heaven?

Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this
infallible judgement, that all men are bound to follow
in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil
magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has
determined, that the civil magistrate orders to be
observed; and he provides by his authority that nobody
shall either act or believe in the business of
religion otherwise than the Church teaches. So that
the judgement of those things is in the Church; the
magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and
requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who
sees not how frequently the name of the Church, which
was venerable in time of the apostles, has been made
use of to throw dust in the people's eyes in the
following ages? But, however, in the present case it
helps us not. The one only narrow way which leads to
heaven is not better known to the magistrate than to
private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take
him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of
the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned
for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many
kings of the Jews, how many of them were there whom
any Israelite, thus blindly following, had not fallen
into idolatry and thereby into destruction? Yet,
nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage and tell
me that all is now safe and secure, because the
magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his
own decrees in matters of religion, but only the
decrees of the Church. Of what Church, I beseech you?
of that, certainly, which likes him best. As if he
that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into
this or the other Church, did not interpose his own
judgement in the matter. What difference is there
whether he lead me himself, or deliver me over to be
led by others? I depend both ways upon his will, and
it is he that determines both ways of my eternal
state. Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal
upon the command of his king have been in any better
condition because somebody had told him that the king
ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor
commanded anything to be done by his subjects in
divine worship but what was approved by the counsel of
priests, and declared to be of divine right by the
doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church
become, therefore, true and saving, because the head
of that sect, the prelates and priests, and those of
that tribe, do all of them, with all their might,
extol and praise it, what religion can ever be
accounted erroneous, false, and destructive? I am
doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I
am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the
Papists, or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot safer for
me to join either unto the one or the other of those
Churches, upon the magistrate's command, because he
commands nothing in religion but by the authority and
counsel of the doctors of that Church?

But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the
Church (if a convention of clergymen, making canons,
must be called by that name) is for the most part more
apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by
the Church. How the Church was under the vicissitude
of orthodox and Arian emperors is very well known. Or
if those things be too remote, our modern English
history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of
Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily
and smoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their
articles of faith, their form of worship, everything
according to the inclination of those kings and
queens. Yet were those kings and queens of such
different minds in point of religion, and enjoined
thereupon such different things, that no man in his
wits (I had almost said none but an atheist) will
presume to say that any sincere and upright worshipper
of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their
several decrees. To conclude, it is the same thing
whether a king that prescribes laws to another man's
religion pretend to do it by his own judgement, or by
the ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The
decisions of churchmen, whose differences and disputes
are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder or safer
than his; nor can all their suffrages joined together
add a new strength to the civil power. Though this
also must be taken notice of- that princes seldom have
any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are
not favourers of their own faith and way of worship.

But, after all, the principal consideration, and which
absolutely determines this controversy, is this:
Although the magistrate's opinion in religion be
sound, and the way that he appoints be truly
Evangelical, yet, if I be not thoroughly persuaded
thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me
in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk
in against the dictates of my conscience will ever
bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may grow
rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be
cured of some disease by remedies that I have not
faith in; but I cannot be saved by a religion that I
distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain
for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of
another man's profession. Faith only and inward
sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with
God. The most likely and most approved remedy can have
no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it
as soon as taken; and you will in vain cram a medicine
down a sick man's throat, which his particular
constitution will be sure to turn into poison. In a
word, whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this
at least is certain, that no religion which I believe
not to be true can be either true or profitable unto
me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their
subjects to come into their Church communion, under
pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they
will come of their own accord, if they believe not,
their coming will nothing avail them. How great
soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and
charity, and concern for the salvation of men's souls,
men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or
no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left
to their own consciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over
one another in matters of religion, let us now
consider what they are to do. All men know and
acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped;
why otherwise do they compel one another unto the
public assemblies? Men, therefore, constituted in this
liberty are to enter into some religious society, that
they meet together, not only for mutual edification,
but to own to the world that they worship God and
offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they
themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think
not unworthy of Him, nor unacceptable to Him; and,
finally, that by the purity of doctrine, holiness of
life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others
unto the love of the true religion, and perform such
other things in religion as cannot be done by each
private man apart.

These religious societies I call Churches; and these,
I say, the magistrate ought to tolerate, for the
business of these assemblies of the people is nothing
but what is lawful for every man in particular to take
care of- I mean the salvation of their souls; nor in
this case is there any difference between the National
Church and other separated congregations.

But as in every Church there are two things especially
to be considered- the outward form and rites of
worship, and the doctrines and articles of things must
be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of
toleration may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place,
that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law,
either in his own Church, or much less in another, the
use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the
worship of God. And this, not only because these
Churches are free societies, but because whatsoever is
practised in the worship of God is only so far
justifiable as it is believed by those that practise
it to be acceptable unto Him. Whatsoever is not done
with that assurance of faith is neither well in
itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose
such things, therefore, upon any people, contrary to
their own judgment, is in effect to command them to
offend God, which, considering that the end of all
religion is to please Him, and that liberty is
essentially necessary to that end, appears to be
absurd beyond expression.

But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny
unto the magistrate all manner of power about
indifferent things, which, if it be not granted, the
whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No,
I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps
none but such, are subjected to the legislative power.
But it does not therefore follow that the magistrate
may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything
that is indifferent. The public good is the rule and
measure of all law-making. If a thing be not useful to
the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent,
it may not presently be established by law.

And further, things never so indifferent in their own
nature, when they are brought into the Church and
worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the
magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use they
have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only
business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and
it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of
it, that this or the other ceremony be there made use
of. Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies
in those religious assemblies does either advantage or
prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For
example, let it be granted that the washing of an
infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing,
let it be granted also that the magistrate understand
such washing to be profitable to the curing or
preventing of any disease the children are subject
unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken
care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be
done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate
has the same right to ordain by law that all children
shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in
order to the purification of their souls? The extreme
difference of these two cases is visible to every one
at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the
child of a Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what
hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects
that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge that such an
injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him,
against his own opinion, to practise in his religion a
thing that is in its nature indifferent, how can we
maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a
Christian?

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot,
by any human authority, be made any part of the
worship of God- for this very reason: because they are
indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not
capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the
Deity, no human power or authority can confer on them
so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do
it. In the common affairs of life that use of
indifferent things which God has not forbidden is free
and lawful, and therefore in those things human
authority has place. But it is not so in matters of
religion. Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful
in the worship of God than as they are instituted by
God Himself and as He, by some positive command, has
ordained them to be made a part of that worship which
He will vouchsafe to accept at the hands of poor
sinful men. Nor, when an incensed Deity shall ask us,
"Who has required these, or such-like things at your
hands?" will it be enough to answer Him that the
magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction
extend thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced
into religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies, what
superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate's
authority, might not (against conscience) be imposed
upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of
these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the
religious use of such things as are in their own
nature indifferent; nor are they sinful upon any other
account than because God is not the author of them.
The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine
are both in their own nature and in the ordinary
occasions of life altogether indifferent. Will any
man, therefore, say that these things could have been
introduced into religion and made a part of divine
worship if not by divine institution? If any human
authority or civil power could have done this, why
might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and
drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of
divine worship? Why not the sprinkling of the blood of
beasts in churches, and expiations by water or fire,
and abundance more of this kind? But these things, how
indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they
come to be annexed unto divine worship, without divine
authority, they are as abominable to God as the
sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable?
What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in
respect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely
distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be
that God required the use of one in His worship and
not of the other? We see, therefore, that indifferent
things, how much soever they be under the power of the
civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be
introduced into religion and imposed upon religious
assemblies, because, in the worship of God, they
wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God
does it with design to please Him and procure His
favour. But that cannot be done by him who, upon the
command of another, offers unto God that which he
knows will be displeasing to Him, because not
commanded by Himself. This is not to please God, or
appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to
provoke Him by a manifest contempt, which is a thing
absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship.

But it will be here asked: "If nothing belonging to
divine worship be left to human discretion, how is it
then that Churches themselves have the power of
ordering anything about the time and place of worship
and the like?" To this I answer that in religious
worship we must distinguish between what is part of
the worship itself and what is but a circumstance.
That is a part of the worship which is believed to be
appointed by God and to be well-pleasing to Him, and
therefore that is necessary. Circumstances are such
things which, though in general they cannot be
separated from worship, yet the particular instances
or modifications of them are not determined, and
therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the
time and place of worship, habit and posture of him
that worships. These are circumstances, and perfectly
indifferent, where God has not given any express
command about them. For example: amongst the Jews the
time and place of their worship and the habits of
those that officiated in it were not mere
circumstances, but a part of the worship itself, in
which, if anything were defective, or different from
the institution, they could not hope that it would be
accepted by God. But these, to Christians under the
liberty of the Gospel, are mere circumstances of
worship, which the prudence of every Church may bring
into such use as shall be judged most subservient to
the end of order, decency, and edification. But, even
under the Gospel, those who believe the first or the
seventh day to be set apart by God, and consecrated
still to His worship, to them that portion of time is
not a simple circumstance, but a real part of Divine
worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to
impose by his laws the use of any rites and ceremonies
in any Church, so neither has he any power to forbid
the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already
received, approved, and practised by any Church;
because, if he did so, he would destroy the Church
itself: the end of whose institution is only to
worship God with freedom after its own manner.

You will say, by this rule, if some congregations
should have a mind to sacrifice infants, or (as the
primitive Christians were falsely accused) lustfully
pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or
practise any other such heinous enormities, is the
magistrate obliged to tolerate them, because they are
committed in a religious assembly? I answer: No. These
things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life,
nor in any private house; and therefore neither are
they so in the worship of God, or in any religious
meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon
account of religion should be desirous to sacrifice a
calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a
law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill
his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he
thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one,
no prejudice to another man's goods. And for the same
reason he may kill his calf also in a religious
meeting. Whether the doing so be well-pleasing to God
or no, it is their part to consider that do it. The
part of the magistrate is only to take care that the
commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be
no injury done to any man, either in life or estate.
And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on
a sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state
of things that the interest of the commonwealth
required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne
for some while, in order to the increasing of the
stock of cattle that had been destroyed by some
extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the
magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his
subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever?
Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the law
is not made about a religious, but a political matter;
nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves,
thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the
Church and the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in
the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the
magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto
any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither
can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of
people for their religious uses. If any man may
lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or
kneeling in his own house, the law ought not to
abridge him of the same liberty in his religious
worship; though in the Church the use of bread and
wine be very different and be there applied to the
mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But
those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of
a people in their ordinary use and are, therefore,
forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be
permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the
magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do
not misuse his authority to the oppression of any
Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said: "What if a Church be idolatrous, is
that also to be tolerated by the magistrate?" I
answer: What power can be given to the magistrate for
the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not
in time and place be made use of to the ruin of an
orthodox one? For it must be remembered that the civil
power is the same everywhere, and the religion of
every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore,
such a power be granted unto the civil magistrate in
spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he may
extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which
is there reputed idolatrous, by the same rule another
magistrate, in some neighbouring country, may oppress
the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian.
The civil power can either change everything in
religion, according to the prince's pleasure, or it
can change nothing. If it be once permitted to
introduce anything into religion by the means of laws
and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but
it will in the same manner be lawful to alter
everything, according to that rule of truth which the
magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever
ought, therefore, to be deprived of his terrestrial
enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even
Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to
be punished either in body or goods for not embracing
our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they
please God in observing the rites of their own country
and that they shall obtain happiness by that means,
they are to be left unto God and themselves. Let us
trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An
inconsiderable and weak number of Christians,
destitute of everything, arrive in a Pagan country;
these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the
bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with
the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given
them, habitations are granted, and they all join
together, and grow up into one body of people. The
Christian religion by this means takes root in that
country and spreads itself, but does not suddenly grow
the strongest. While things are in this condition
peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are
preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate
becomes a Christian, and by that means their party
becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all
compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be
violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless
these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules
of equity and the law of Nature and no ways offending
against the laws of the society, I say, unless they
will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new
and strange one, they are to be turned out of the
lands and possessions of their forefathers and perhaps
deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears
what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of
dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the
pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves
for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted
out of any place by laws, punishments, fire, and
sword, may apply this story to himself. For the reason
of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And
neither Pagans there, nor any dissenting Christians
here, can, with any right, be deprived of their
worldly goods by the predominating faction of a court-
church; nor are any civil rights to be either changed
or violated upon account of religion in one place more
than another.

But idolatry, say some, is a sin and therefore not to
be tolerated. If they said it were therefore to be
avoided, the inference were good. But it does not
follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to
be punished by the magistrate. For it does not belong
unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in
punishing everything, indifferently, that he takes to
be a sin against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness,
idleness, and many other things are sins by the
consent of men, which yet no man ever said were to be
punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they
are not prejudicial to other men's rights, nor do they
break the public peace of societies. Nay, even the
sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by
laws; unless, in certain cases, in which the real
turpitude of the thing and the offence against God are
not considered, but only the injury done unto men's
neighbours and to the commonwealth. And what if in
another country, to a Mahometan or a Pagan prince, the
Christian religion seem false and offensive to God;
may not the Christians for the same reason, and after
the same manner, be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that, by the law of Moses,
idolaters were to be rooted out. True, indeed, by the
law of Moses; but that is not obligatory to us
Christians. Nobody pretends that everything generally
enjoined by the law of Moses ought to be practised by
Christians; but there is nothing more frivolous than
that common distinction of moral, judicial, and
ceremonial law, which men ordinarily make use of. For
no positive law whatsoever can oblige any people but
those to whom it is given. "Hear, O Israel,"
sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of
Moses only to that people. And this consideration
alone is answer enough unto those that urge the
authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of
capital punishment upon idolaters. But, however, I
will examine this argument a little more particularly.

The case of idolaters, in respect of the Jewish
commonwealth, falls under a double consideration. The
first is of those who, being initiated in the Mosaical
rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did
afterwards apostatise from the worship of the God of
Israel. These were proceeded against as traitors and
rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. For the
commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all
others, was an absolute theocracy; nor was there, or
could there be, any difference between that
commonwealth and the Church. The laws established
there concerning the worship of One Invisible Deity
were the civil laws of that people and a part of their
political government, in which God Himself was the
legislator. Now, if any one can shew me where there is
a commonwealth at this time, constituted upon that
foundation, I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical
laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil,
and that the subjects of that government both may and
ought to be kept in strict conformity with that Church
by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such
thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth.
There are, indeed, many cities and kingdoms that have
embraced the faith of Christ, but they have retained
their ancient form of government, with which the law
of Christ hath not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath
taught men how, by faith and good works, they may
obtain eternal life; but He instituted no
commonwealth. He prescribed unto His followers no new
and peculiar form of government, nor put He the sword
into any magistrate's hand, with commission to make
use of it in forcing men to forsake their former
religion and receive His.

Secondly, foreigners and such as were strangers to the
commonwealth of Israel were not compelled by force to
observe the rites of the Mosaical law; but, on the
contrary, in the very same place where it is ordered
that an Israelite that was an idolater should be put
to death,* there it is provided that strangers should
not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that the seven
nations that possessed the land which was promised to
the Israelites were utterly to be cut off; but this
was not singly because they were idolaters. For if
that had been the reason, why were the Moabites and
other nations to be spared? No: the reason is this.
God being in a peculiar manner the King of the Jews,
He could not suffer the adoration of any other deity
(which was properly an act of high treason against
Himself) in the land of Canaan, which was His kingdom.
For such a manifest revolt could no ways consist with
His dominion, which was perfectly political in that
country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out
of the bounds of His kingdom because it was an
acknowledgment of another god, that is say, another
king, against the laws of Empire. The inhabitants were
also to be driven out, that the entire possession of
the land might be given to the Israelites. And for the
like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out
of their countries by the children of Esau and Lot;
and their lands, upon the same grounds, given by God
to the invaders.*(2) But, though all idolatry was thus
rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater
was not brought to execution. The whole family of
Rahab, the whole nation of the Gibeonites, articled
with Joshua, and were allowed by treaty; and there
were many captives amongst the Jews who were
idolaters. David and Solomon subdued many countries
without the confines of the Land of Promise and
carried their conquests as far as Euphrates. Amongst
so many captives taken, so many nations reduced under
their obedience, we find not one man forced into the
Jewish religion and the worship of the true God and
punished for idolatry, though all of them were
certainly guilty of it. If any one, indeed, becoming a
proselyte, desired to be made a denizen of their
commonwealth, he was obliged to submit to their laws;
that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did
willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint. He
did not unwillingly submit, to show his obedience, but
he sought and solicited for it as a privilege. And, as
soon as he was admitted, he became subject to the laws
of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was
forbidden within the borders of the land of Canaan.
But that law (as I have said) did not reach to any of
those regions, however subjected unto the Jews, that
were situated without those bounds.

Footnotes
 * Exod. 22, 20, 21.
 *(2) Deut. 2.


Thus far concerning outward worship. Let us now
consider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are some of them practical
and some speculative. Now, though both sorts consist
in the knowledge of truth, yet these terminate simply
in the understanding, those influence the will and
manners. Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles
of faith (as they are called) which are required only
to be believed, cannot be imposed on any Church by the
law of the land. For it is absurd that things should
be enjoined by laws which are not in men's power to
perform. And to believe this or that to be true does
not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been
said already. "But." will some say; "let men at least
profess that they believe." A sweet religion, indeed,
that obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both to
God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the
magistrate thinks to save men thus, he seems to
understand little of the way of salvation. And if he
does it not in order to save them, why is he so
solicitous about the articles of faith as to enact
them by a law?

Further, the magistrate ought not to forbid the
preaching or professing of any speculative opinions in
any Church because they have no manner of relation to
the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic
believe that to be really the body of Christ which
another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to
his neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New
Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby
alter anything in men's civil rights. If a heathen
doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to be
punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the
magistrate and the estates of the people may be
equally secure whether any man believe these things or
no. I readily grant that these opinions are false and
absurd. But the business of laws is not to provide for
the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security
of the commonwealth and of every particular man's
goods and person. And so it ought to be. For the truth
certainly would do well enough if she were once left
to shift for herself. She seldom has received and, I
fear, never will receive much assistance from the
power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known
and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws,
nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance
into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the
assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. But if
Truth makes not her way into the understanding by her
own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed
force violence can add to her. Thus much for
speculative opinions. Let us now proceed to practical
ones.

A good life, in which consist not the least part of
religion and true piety, concerns also the civil
government; and in it lies the safety both of men's
souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong,
therefore, to the jurisdiction both of the outward and
inward court; both of the civil and domestic governor;
I mean both of the magistrate and conscience. Here,
therefore, is great danger, lest one of these
jurisdictions intrench upon the other, and discord
arise between the keeper of the public peace and the
overseers of souls. But if what has been already said
concerning the limits of both these governments be
rightly considered, it will easily remove all
difficulty in this matter.

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal
happiness or misery; whose happiness depending upon
his believing and doing those things in this life
which are necessary to the obtaining of God's favour,
and are prescribed by God to that end. It follows from
thence, first, that the observance of these things is
the highest obligation that lies upon mankind and that
our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to
be exercised in the search and performance of them;
because there is nothing in this world that is of any
consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly,
that seeing one man does not violate the right of
another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of
worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another
man's affairs, therefore, the care of each man's
salvation belongs only to himself. But I would not
have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn
all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours
to reduce men from errors, which are indeed the
greatest duty of a Christian. Any one may employ as
many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards
the promoting of another man's salvation. But all
force and compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to
be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter
to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions
of another, further than he himself is persuaded.
Every man in that has the supreme and absolute
authority of judging for himself. And the reason is
because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can
receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have
also their temporal lives here upon earth; the state
whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration
uncertain, they have need of several outward
conveniences to the support thereof, which are to be
procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those
things that are necessary to the comfortable support
of our lives are not the spontaneous products of
nature, nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for
our use. This part, therefore, draws on another care
and necessarily gives another employment. But the
pravity of mankind being such that they had rather
injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's
labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the
necessity of preserving men in the possession of what
honest industry has already acquired and also of
preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they
may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to
enter into society with one another, that by mutual
assistance and joint force they may secure unto each
other their properties, in the things that contribute
to the comfort and happiness of this life, leaving in
the meanwhile to every man the care of his own eternal
happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be
facilitated by another man's industry, nor can the
loss of it turn to another man's prejudice, nor the
hope of it be forced from him by any external
violence. But, forasmuch as men thus entering into
societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of
assistance for the defence of their temporal goods,
may, nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the
rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the
hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this
evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of
citizens; the remedy of the other in laws; and the
care of all things relating both to one and the other
is committed by the society to the civil magistrate.
This is the original, this is the use, and these are
the bounds of the legislative (which is the supreme)
power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision may
be made for the security of each man's private
possessions; for the peace, riches, and public
commodities of the whole people; and, as much as
possible, for the increase of their inward strength
against foreign invasions.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to
understand to what end the legislative power ought to
be directed and by what measures regulated; and that
is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the
society; which is the sole reason of men's entering
into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at
in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to
men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that
is that every one should do what he in his conscience
is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on
whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their
eternal happiness. For obedience is due, in the first
place, to God and, afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask: "What if the magistrate should
enjoin anything by his authority that appears unlawful
to the conscience of a private person?" I answer that,
if government be faithfully administered and the
counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the
public good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps,
it do so fall out, I say, that such a private person
is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful,
and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not
unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgement of
any person concerning a law enacted in political
matters, for the public good, does not take away the
obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation.
But if the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie
not within the verge of the magistrate's authority
(as, for example, that the people, or any party
amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange
religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of
another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by
that law, against their consciences. For the political
society is instituted for no other end, but only to
secure every man's possession of the things of this
life. The care of each man's soul and of the things of
heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth
nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every
man's self. Thus the safeguard of men's lives and of
the things that belong unto this life is the business
of the commonwealth; and the preserving of those
things unto their owners is the duty of the
magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take
away these worldly things from this man or party and
give them to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow
subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has
no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for
their religion, which whether it be true or false does
no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow
subjects, which are the things that only belong unto
the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this
to be for the public good? I answer: As the private
judgement of any particular person, if erroneous, does
not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the
private judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate
does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon
his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of
the government granted him, nor ever was in the power
of the people to grant, much less if he make it his
business to enrich and advance his followers and
fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what
if the magistrate believe that he has a right to make
such laws and that they are for the public good, and
his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be judge
between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no
judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and
the people. God, I say, is the only judge in this
case, who will retribute unto every one at the last
day according to his deserts; that is, according to
his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to
promote piety, and the public weal, and peace of
mankind. But What shall be done in the meanwhile? I
answer: The principal and chief care of every one
ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next
place, of the public peace; though yet there are very
few will think it is peace there, where they see all
laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one
managed by law, the other by force; and these are of
that nature that where the one ends, the other always
begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the
power of the magistrate in the different constitutions
of nations. I only know what usually happens where
controversies arise without a judge to determine them.
You will say, then, the magistrate being the stronger
will have his will and carry his point. Without doubt;
but the question is not here concerning the
doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions
contrary to human society, or to those moral rules
which are necessary to the preservation of civil
society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of
these, indeed, examples in any Church are rare. For no
sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness as
that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of
religion, such things as manifestly undermine the
foundations of society and are, therefore, condemned
by the judgement of all mankind; because their own
interest, peace, reputation, everything would be
thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the
commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and
to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative
covered over with a specious show of deceitful words,
but in effect opposite to the civil right of the
community. For example: we cannot find any sect that
teaches, expressly and openly, that men are not
obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be
dethroned by those that differ from them in religion;
or that the dominion of all things belongs only to
themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly
and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand
of the magistrate and awaken all the care of the
commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading
of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find
those that say the same things in other words. What
else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be
kept with heretics? Their meaning, forsooth, is that
the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto
themselves; for they declare all that are not of their
communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them
so whensoever they think fit. What can be the meaning
of their asserting that kings excommunicated forfeit
their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they
thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing
kings, because they challenge the power of
excommunication, as the peculiar right of their
hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also
an assertion by which those that maintain it do
plainly lay claim to the possession of all things. For
they are not so wanting to themselves as not to
believe, or at least as not to profess themselves to
be the truly pious and faithful. These, therefore, and
the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious,
and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto
themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above
other mortals, in civil concernments; or who upon
pretence of religion do challenge any manner of
authority over such as are not associated with them in
their ecclesiastical communion, I say these have no
right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither
those that will not own and teach the duty of
tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For
what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but
that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize
the Government and possess themselves of the estates
and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they
only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so
long until they find themselves strong enough to
effect it?

Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated
by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a
bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby
ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and
service of another prince. For by this means the
magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign
jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own
people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against
his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and
fallacious distinction between the Court and the
Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience;
especially when both the one and the other are equally
subject to the absolute authority of the same person,
who has not only power to persuade the members of his
Church to whatsoever he lists, either as purely
religious, or in order thereunto, but can also enjoin
it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for
any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in
his religion, but in everything else a faithful
subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same
time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind
obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself
is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames
the feigned oracles of that religion according to his
pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians
would yet more apparently renounce their government if
he acknowledged the same person to be head of his
Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.

Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny
the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths,
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold
upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but
even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those
that by their atheism undermine and destroy all
religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon
to challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for
other practical opinions, though not absolutely free
from all error, if they do not tend to establish
domination over others, or civil impunity to the
Church in which they are taught, there can be no
reason why they should not be tolerated.

It remains that I say something concerning those
assemblies which, being vulgarly called and perhaps
having sometimes been conventicles and nurseries of
factions and seditions, are thought to afford against
this doctrine of toleration. But this has not happened
by anything peculiar unto the genius of such
assemblies, but by the unhappy circumstances of an
oppressed or ill-settled liberty. These accusations
would soon cease if the law of toleration were once so
settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down
toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and
teach that liberty of conscience is every man's
natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as to
themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in
matters of religion either by law or force. The
establishment of this one thing would take away all
ground of complaints and tumults upon account of
conscience; and these causes of discontents and
animosities being once removed, there would remain
nothing in these assemblies that were not more
peaceable and less apt to produce disturbance of state
than in any other meetings whatsoever. But let us
examine particularly the heads of these accusations.

You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the
public peace and threaten the commonwealth. I answer:
If this be so, why are there daily such numerous
meetings in markets and Courts of Judicature? Why are
crowds upon the Exchange and a concourse of people in
cities suffered? You will reply: "Those are civil
assemblies, but these we object against are
ecclesiastical." I answer: It is a likely thing,
indeed, that such assemblies as are altogether remote
from civil affairs should be most apt to embroil them.
Oh, but civil assemblies are composed of men that
differ from one another in matters of religion, but
these ecclesiastical meetings are of persons that are
all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of
religion were in effect a conspiracy against the
commonwealth; or as if men would not be so much the
more warmly unanimous in religion the less liberty
they had of assembling. But it will be urged still
that civil assemblies are open and free for any one to
enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more
private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine
machinations. I answer that this is not strictly true,
for many civil assemblies are not open to everyone.
And if some religious meetings be private, who are
they (I beseech you) that are to be blamed for it,
those that desire, or those that forbid their being
public! Again, you will say that religious communion
does exceedingly unite men's minds and affections to
one another and is therefore the more dangerous. But
if this be so, why is not the magistrate afraid of his
own Church; and why does he not forbid their
assemblies as things dangerous to his Government? You
will say because he himself is a part and even the
head of them. As if he were not also a part of the
commonwealth, and the head of the whole people!

Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is
afraid of other Churches, but not of his own, because
he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and
cruel to the other. These he treats like children, and
indulges them even to wantonness. Those he uses as
slaves and, how blamelessly soever they demean
themselves, recompenses them no otherwise than by
galleys, prisons, confiscations, and death. These he
cherishes and defends; those he continually scourges
and oppresses. Let him turn the tables. Or let those
dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in civils as
his other subjects, and he will quickly find that
these religious meetings will be no longer dangerous.
For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is
not religion inspires them to it in their meetings,
but their sufferings and oppressions that make them
willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate
governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but
oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to
cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that
seditions are very frequently raised upon pretence of
religion, but it is as true that for religion subjects
are frequently ill treated and live miserably. Believe
me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any
peculiar temper of this or that Church or religious
society, but from the common disposition of all
mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burthen
endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls
their necks. Suppose this business of religion were
let alone, and that there were some other distinction
made between men and men upon account of their
different complexions, shapes, and features, so that
those who have black hair (for example) or grey eyes
should not enjoy the same privileges as other
citizens; that they should not be permitted either to
buy or sell, or live by their callings; that parents
should not have the government and education of their
own children; that all should either be excluded from
the benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges;
can it be doubted but these persons, thus
distinguished from others by the colour of their hair
and eyes, and united together by one common
persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate
as any others that had associated themselves merely
upon the account of religion? Some enter into company
for trade and profit, others for want of business have
their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins some and
religion others. But there is only one thing which
gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is
oppression.

You will say "What, will you have people to meet at
divine service against the magistrate's will?" I
answer: Why, I pray, against his will? Is it not both
lawful and necessary that they should meet? Against
his will, do you say? That is what I complain of; that
is the very root of all the mischief. Why are
assemblies less sufferable in a church than in a
theatre or market? Those that meet there are not
either more vicious or more turbulent than those that
meet elsewhere. The business in that is that they are
ill used, and therefore they are not to be suffered.
Take away the partiality that is used towards them in
matters of common right; change the laws, take away
the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all
things will immediately become safe and peaceable;
nay, those that are averse to the religion of the
magistrate will think themselves so much the more
bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as
their condition is better in that place than
elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations,
like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch
one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed
in the form of the government, because they can hope
for nothing better than what they already enjoy - that
is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects
under a just and moderate government. Now if that
Church which agrees in religion with the prince be
esteemed the chief support of any civil government,
and that for no other reason (as has already been
shown) than because the prince is kind and the laws
are favourable to it, how much greater will be the
security of government where all good subjects, of
whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction
upon account of religion, enjoying the same favour of
the prince and the same benefit of the laws, shall
become the common support and guard of it, and where
none will have any occasion to fear the severity of
the laws but those that do injuries to their
neighbours and offend against the civil peace?

That we may draw towards a conclusion. The sum of all
we drive at is that every man may enjoy the same
rights that are granted to others. Is it permitted to
worship God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted
to do it in the Geneva form also. Is it permitted to
speak Latin in the market-place? Let those that have a
mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church.
Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel,
stand, sit, or use any other posture; and to clothe
himself in white or black, in short or in long
garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread,
drink wine, or wash with water in the church. In a
word, whatsoever things are left free by law in the
common occasions of life, let them remain free unto
every Church in divine worship. Let no man's life, or
body, or house, or estate, suffer any manner of
prejudice upon these accounts. Can you allow of the
Presbyterian discipline? Why should not the Episcopal
also have what they like? Ecclesiastical authority,
whether it be administered by the hands of a single
person or many, is everywhere the same; and neither
has any jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner
of power of compulsion, nor anything at all to do with
riches and revenues.

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by
daily experience and public allowance. These are
allowed to people of some one persuasion; why not to
all? If anything pass in a religious meeting
seditiously and contrary to the public peace, it is to
be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than
as if it had happened in a fair or market. These
meetings ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and
flagitious fellows. Nor ought it to be less lawful for
men to meet in churches than in halls; nor are one
part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for
their meeting together than others. Every one is to be
accountable for his own actions, and no man is to be
laid under a suspicion or odium for the fault of
another. Those that are seditious, murderers, thieves,
robbers, adulterers, slanderers, etc., of whatsoever
Church, whether national or not, ought to be punished
and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable
and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be
upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects. Thus if
solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public
worship be permitted to any one sort of professors,
all these things ought to be permitted to the
Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians,
Quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we
may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to
another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought
to be excluded from the civil rights of the
commonwealth because of his religion. The Gospel
commands no such thing. The Church which "judgeth not
those that are without"* wants it not. And the
commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men
that are honest, peaceable, and industrious, requires
it not. Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with
us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and
worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private
houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not
allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more
false, their worship more abominable, or is the civil
peace more endangered by their meeting in public than
in their private houses? But if these things may be
granted to Jews and Pagans, surely the condition of
any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs in a
Christian commonwealth.

Footnotes
 * I Cor. 5. 12, 13.


You will say, perhaps: "Yes, it ought to be; because
they are more inclinable to factions, tumults, and
civil wars." I answer: Is this the fault of the
Christian religion? If it be so, truly the Christian
religion is the worst of all religions and ought
neither to be embraced by any particular person, nor
tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the
genius, this the nature of the Christian religion, to
be turbulent and destructive to the civil peace, that
Church itself which the magistrate indulges will not
always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any
such thing of that religion which carries the greatest
opposition to covetousness, ambition, discord,
contention, and all manner of inordinate desires, and
is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever
was. We must, therefore, seek another cause of those
evils that are charged upon religion. And, if we
consider right, we shall find it to consist wholly in
the subject that I am treating of. It is not the
diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but
the refusal of toleration to those that are of
different opinions (which might have been granted),
that has produced all the bustles and wars that have
been in the Christian world upon account of religion.
The heads and leaders of the Church, moved by avarice
and insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the
immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous
superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and
animated them against those that dissent from
themselves, by preaching unto them, contrary to the
laws of the Gospel and to the precepts of charity,
that schismatics and heretics are to be outed of their
possessions and destroyed. And thus have they mixed
together and confounded two things that are in
themselves most different, the Church and the
commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men
patiently to suffer themselves to be stripped of the
goods which they have got by their honest industry,
and, contrary to all the laws of equity, both human
and divine, to be delivered up for a prey to other
men's violence and rapine; especially when they are
otherwise altogether blameless; and that the occasion
for which they are thus treated does not at all belong
to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, but entirely to
the conscience of every particular man for the conduct
of which he is accountable to God only; what else can
be expected but that these men, growing weary of the
evils under which they labour, should in the end think
it lawful for them to resist force with force, and to
defend their natural rights (which are not forfeitable
upon account of religion) with arms as well as they
can? That this has been hitherto the ordinary course
of things is abundantly evident in history, and that
it will continue to be so hereafter is but too
apparent in reason. It cannot indeed, be otherwise so
long as the principle of persecution for religion
shall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with
magistrate and people, and so long as those that ought
to be the preachers of peace and concord shall
continue with all their art and strength to excite men
to arms and sound the trumpet of war. But that
magistrates should thus suffer these incendiaries and
disturbers of the public peace might justly be
wondered at if it did not appear that they have been
invited by them unto a participation of the spoil, and
have therefore thought fit to make use of their
covetousness and pride as means whereby to increase
their own power. For who does not see that these good
men are, indeed, more ministers of the government than
ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattering the
ambition and favouring the dominion of princes and men
in authority, they endeavour with all their might to
promote that tyranny in the commonwealth which
otherwise they should not be able to establish in the
Church? This is the unhappy agreement that we see
between the Church and State. Whereas if each of them
would contain itself within its own bounds - the one
attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth,
the other to the salvation of souls - it is impossible
that any discord should ever have happened between
them. Sed pudet hoec opprobria. etc. God Almighty
grant, I beseech Him, that the gospel of peace may at
length be preached, and that civil magistrates,
growing more careful to conform their own consciences
to the law of God and less solicitous about the
binding of other men's consciences by human laws, may,
like fathers of their country, direct all their
counsels and endeavours to promote universally the
civil welfare of all their children, except only of
such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to
their brethren; and that all ecclesiastical men, who
boast themselves to be the successors of the Apostles,
walking peaceably and modestly in the Apostles' steps,
without intermeddling with State Affairs, may apply
themselves wholly to promote the salvation of souls.


FAREWELL.





PERHAPS it may not be amiss to add a few things
concerning heresy and schism. A Turk is not, nor can
be, either heretic or schismatic to a Christian; and
if any man fall off from the Christian faith to
Mahometism, he does not thereby become a heretic or
schismatic, but an apostate and an infidel. This
nobody doubts of; and by this it appears that men of
different religions cannot be heretics or schismatics
to one another.

We are to inquire, therefore, what men are of the same
religion. Concerning which it is manifest that those
who have one and the same rule of faith and worship
are of the same religion; and those who have not the
same rule of faith and worship are of different
religions. For since all things that belong unto that
religion are contained in that rule, it follows
necessarily that those who agree in one rule are of
one and the same religion, and vice versa. Thus Turks
and Christians are of different religions, because
these take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their
religion, and those the Alcoran. And for the same
reason there may be different religions also even
amongst Christians. The Papists and Lutherans, though
both of them profess faith in Christ and are therefore
called Christians, yet are not both of the same
religion, because these acknowledge nothing but the
Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their
religion, those take in also traditions and the
decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule
of their religion; and thus the Christians of St. John
(as they are called) and the Christians of Geneva are
of different religions, because these also take only
the Scriptures, and those I know not what traditions,
for the rule of their religion.

This being settled, it follows, first, that heresy is
a separation made in ecclesiastical communion between
men of the same religion for some opinions no way
contained in the rule itself; and, secondly, that
amongst those who acknowledge nothing but the Holy
Scriptures to be their rule of faith, heresy is a
separation made in their Christian communion for
opinions not contained in the express words of
Scripture. Now this separation may be made in a
twofold manner:

1. When the greater part, or by the magistrate's
patronage the stronger part, of the Church separates
itself from others by excluding them out of her
communion because they will not profess their belief
of certain opinions which are not the express words of
the Scripture. For it is not the paucity of those that
are separated, nor the authority of the magistrate,
that can make any man guilty of heresy, but he only is
a heretic who divides the Church into parts,
introduces names and marks of distinction, and
voluntarily makes a separation because of such
opinions.

2. When any one separates himself from the communion
of a Church because that Church does not publicly
profess some certain opinions which the Holy
Scriptures do not expressly teach.

Both these are heretics because they err in
fundamentals, and they err obstinately against
knowledge; for when they have determined the Holy
Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they
nevertheless lay down certain propositions as
fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and
because others will not acknowledge these additional
opinions of theirs, nor build upon them as if they
were necessary and fundamental, they therefore make a
separation in the Church, either by withdrawing
themselves from others, or expelling the others from
them. Nor does it signify anything for them to say
that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to
Scripture and to the analogy of faith; for if they be
conceived in the express words of Scripture, there can
be no question about them, because those things are
acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine
inspiration and therefore fundamental. But if they say
that the articles which they require to be professed
are consequences deduced from the Scripture, it is
undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess
such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule
of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude
those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to
be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture; and to
make a separation for such things as these, which
neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become
heretics; for I do not think there is any man arrived
to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his
consequences and interpretations of Scripture as
divine inspirations and compare the articles of faith
that he has framed according to his own fancy with the
authority of Scripture. I know there are some
propositions so evidently agreeable to Scripture that
nobody can deny them to be drawn from thence, but
about those, therefore, there can be no difference.
This only I say - that however clearly we may think
this or the other doctrine to be deduced from
Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon
others as a necessary article of faith because we
believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith,
unless we would be content also that other doctrines
should be imposed upon us in the same manner, and that
we should be compelled to receive and profess all the
different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans,
Calvinists, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, and other sects
which the contrivers of symbols, systems, and
confessions are accustomed to deliver to their
followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the
Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant
arrogance of those men who think that they themselves
can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly
than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom
of God.

Thus much concerning heresy, which word in common use
is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let
us now consider schism, which is a crime near akin to
it; for both these words seem unto me to signify an
ill-grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion
made about things not necessary. But since use, which
is the supreme law in matter of language, has
determined that heresy relates to errors in faith, and
schism to those in worship or discipline, we must
consider them under that distinction.

Schism, then, for the same reasons that have already
been alleged, is nothing else but a separation made in
the communion of the Church upon account of something
in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is
not any necessary part of it. Now, nothing in worship
or discipline can be necessary to Christian communion
but what Christ our legislator, or the Apostles by
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in
express words.

In a word, he that denies not anything that the Holy
Scriptures teach in express words, nor makes a
separation upon occasion of anything that is not
manifestly contained in the sacred text - however he
may be nicknamed by any sect of Christians and
declared by some or all of them to be utterly void of
true Christianity - yet in deed and in truth this man
cannot be either a heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely
and more advantageously, but it is enough to have
hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your parts.